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THE CP 171 PROPOSALS
Law Commission Consultation Paper 171, TrusteeExemption Clauses, has set out to consider the extentto which trustees can exclude or restrict their
liability to the beneficiaries for breach of trust. The
relatively unrestricted nature of trustees’ liability for
breach of trust has resulted in the use of common form
clauses in trust instruments which exclude or restrict that
liability. In 1998 the Court of Appeal dispelled all doubts
as to the validity of trustee exemption clauses which
exclude liability for ordinary or even gross negligence in
Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241. Furthermore, the Trustee
Act 2000, which came into force on 1 February 2001,
expanded trustees’ powers – but without making any
attempt to regulate the use of trustee exemption clauses.
In CP 171 the Commission makes provisional
proposals for the regulation of trustee exemption clauses.
The Commission does not believe that an absolute
prohibition on all trustee exemption clauses is justifiable at
present, but believes there is a “very strong case” for some
regulation – mainly because the increased use of trustee
exemption clauses has reduced the protection afforded to
beneficiaries in the event of breach of trust. There is also
little doubt that the decision in Armitage v Nurse sits uneasily
in today’s society where consumers who suffer loss as a
result of sub-standard goods or services expect the law to
provide them with the means of redress.
The Commission proposes to draw a distinction
between the professional trustee (who receives money for
his/her services) and the lay trustee (defined by the paper
as everyone else). The provisional proposals, which would
require legislation, are:
• All trustees should be given power to make payments
out of the trust fund to purchase indemnity insurance
to cover their liability for breach of trust;
• Professional trustees should not be able to rely on
clauses which exclude their liability for breach of trust
arising from negligence;
• In so far as professional trustees may not exclude
liability for breach of trust they should not be
permitted to claim indemnity from the trust fund;
• In determining whether professional trustees have
been negligent, the court should have power to disapply
duty exclusion clauses or extended powers where
reliance on such clauses would be inconsistent with the
overall purposes of the trust and it would be
unreasonable in the circumstances for the trustees to
be exempted from liability;
• Any regulation of trustee exemption clauses should be
made applicable not only to trusts governed by English
law, but also to persons carrying on a trust business in
England and Wales;
• Any legislation should apply to any breaches of trust
which occur on or after the date when it come into
force, but it should not apply to breaches of trust which
precede that date.
The views of consultees were sought on other possible
options for reform, such as whether a trustee should be
able to rely on a trustee exemption clause to exclude or
restrict his/her liability for breach of trust only where the
clause satisfies the test of reasonableness; and whether
professional trustees should not be able to rely upon a
trustee exemption clause where it is not reasonable to do
so by reference to all the circumstances including the
nature and extent of the breach of trust itself.
The debate over trustee
exemption clauses
On 10 April the Society for Advanced Legal Studies and the Law
Commission held a joint seminar at Charles Clore House in which Law
Commissioner Stuart Bridge and Professor David Hayton of Kings
College, London, invited debate on the proposals contained in the
Commission’s consultation paper on trustee exemption clauses. A brief
summary of these suggestions for reform is given below, followed by a
response written by Mr Gregory Hill, who appeared in Armitage v Nurse (see
further below).
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A
rticle
This response is in three parts: (i) a summary of whatI believe are the most important points; (ii) aslightly amplified version of my notes prepared for
the 10 April seminar; and (iii) answers to the specific
questions in part V of the consultation paper.
I SUMMARY
(i) Paragraph 4.2 of the consultation paper (CP) rightly
points out the wide variety of uses to which trusts can
be put; in my view it is not necessarily appropriate for
any regulation of trustee exemption clauses to apply –
or to take the same form – in relation to all types of
trust. (To an extent this is already the position, as
noted in CP paras. 2.67-68.)
(ii) As to traditional “family” trusts:
(a) The settlor/testator is the right person to strike
the balance between beneficiaries’ expectations
and protection of trustees; no interference with
settlor autonomy is justified in this field.
(b) It is right for the law to insist that settlors/testators
do apply their minds to the striking of that balance
and do not insert exemption clauses (or
professional trustee/trust corporation charging
clauses, but they are a different problem) without
understanding and considering them –
particularly where the professional adviser
preparing the instrument, or his firm/associates,
will benefit from the clause in question.
(c) The appropriate mechanism of control for this
purpose is the adoption/development of
principles similar to the probate principles
applicable to a will prepared by or on instructions
from someone taking a benefit under it. Such a
person must affirmatively prove that the
testator/testatrix knew and approved of the provision
in question, and must establish “the righteousness of
the transaction”, but a will draftsman is not legally
disabled from taking a benefit if his client really
wants to confer it. If the onus is discharged to the
court’s satisfaction (the cogency of the evidence
having to be appropriate to the significance of the
gift), the will is effective as written.
(iii) In relation to trusts with a “commercial” function, the
proposal in the CP to exclude entirely a professional
trustee’s ability to rely on an exemption clause in
relation to (alleged) negligence contrasts
incongruously with the proposals in Consultation
Paper 166 on contractual exemption clauses. There it
is not suggested that any class of contracting party
should be wholly debarred from relying on clauses
exempting from liability for negligence causing purely
economic loss, but a “fair and reasonable” test is
preferred. Where the economic functions of trusts
and contracts are similar, it seems likely that similar
controls on “contracting out” will be appropriate.
(iv) If there are any situations where settlor autonomy
(properly protected) has to be displaced in favour of
control of exemption clauses by substantive rules of
law, a requirement of reasonableness is less
objectionable than completely outlawing reliance on
such clauses in relation to negligence. Insurance is not
Law Commission Consultation
Paper 171: a response
By Gregory Hill
What follows is my personal response only; no part of it is intended to be confidential, and
if I have said anything of interest, I have no objection to it being quoted and attributed. My
qualification to express views is that I have been in practice at the Chancery Bar since 1973,
my practice including trusts work; and I have had particular experience of a trustee
exemption clause, in that I was counsel for the successful, non-fraudulent and – as was
averred in his pleadings but did not have to be resolved – non-negligent, trustee in Armitage
v Nurse. Part of what follows is already known to the Commission, in that I attended (and
harangued) the seminar at the Society for Advanced Legal Studies on 10 April 2003, and gave
a copy of my notes to Mr Stuart Bridge. The Commission is welcome, if so minded, to ask




a panacea, not least because professional negligence
indemnity cover in the full amount of the funds of a
large trust (eg the value of the property held by the
security trustee in a mortgage securitisation) may not
be available at an affordable cost (and even if available
now, may not remain so over the life of the trust). A
reasonableness test would at least enable a trustee to
negotiate for appointment on terms that his/its
negligence liability was to be limited to a specified
sum, capable of being insured.
(v) The suggestion in CP para 4.101 that any legislative
reform should apply to subsequent breaches of
existing trusts is wrong in principle, particularly in
relation to a reform disabling any class of trustees from
relying on an exemption clause so far as applicable to
(alleged) negligence. Unless (perhaps) there was an
absolute right for a trustee to retire (with provision for
the Public Trustee or the Chancery Division to take
over any trust where all the trustees did so), reform in
the terms suggested would amount to forcing the
affected trustees to continue in office on terms
significantly more onerous than they had agreed
(particularly if the size of the fund were such that full
insurance cover could not realistically be obtained).
Without pretending to any particular human rights
expertise, I should expect arguments to be advanced
which relied on Convention principles of “legal
certainty” and “security of possessions” (possibly even
“forced labour”, though that may be a far-fetched
speculation).
II NOTES OF POINTS MADE AT 10 APRIL
SEMINAR
(i) The CP starts (para 4.3) from a false premise. Trustees
do not exclude or limit their liability: the settlor does
so.
(ii) In a family trust, there may be excellent reasons for
giving the trustees a high degree of protection – not
only to protect them, but to protect silly beneficiaries
from themselves. The purpose of a trust is to have the
trustees rather than the beneficiary(ies) looking after
the fund – for example because a beneficiary is
spendthrift/bad at managing money/liable to be led
astray by spouse/partner/other close associate. In
those circumstances a settlor may feel bound to say to
his solicitor and accountant something along the lines
of:
“I am very fond of my daughter and her children are lovely,
but her new husband is a menace. He will try to lean on her,
and on you if you agree to act as trustees of my will, to get
whatever I leave her into his hands, when it will vanish in
some harebrained scheme of his. I dare not give money
directly to her; I trust you to look after her and the children
and I want you to do so, but if you act, you will need to
have something in the will to enable you to see off summarily
all the ridiculous threats she, under his influence, will
inevitably make”.
[Note: In this context consider, for example, the numerous
mortgage cases in which a wife has established as against her
husband that he used undue influence to procure a security
from her in aid of his or his business’s obligations. I suggest
that trustees holding property for such a wife and her
children should not be deprived of any protection their
settlor/testator may have seen fit to give them against the
blandishments or threats the husband may bring to bear, and
the settlor/testator should not be prevented from making and
giving effect to a judgment on that issue].
Whether a “not liable for anything except fraud” clause is
appropriate is a matter of judgment; the right person to
make that judgment is the settlor.
[Note: CP para 4.16(3) is, with respect, misconceived: the
settlor could retain the fund himself and use it to make
periodic gifts for specific purposes, or leave it by will to a
friend beneficially with a precatory expression of wishes in
favour of the “beneficiaries”, who would not in either case
have any ground for complaint over how it was
invested/administered; there is no sufficient reason for not
allowing the settlor to decide also to give the beneficiaries the
right to an account and payment of whatever there may be
left at some future date, but no more].
(iii) When such a clause is appropriate, its purpose is not
to allow the trustees to be negligent and get away with
it (any more than the purpose of diplomatic immunity
is to allow diplomats to get away with criminal
conduct): it is to protect the trustees from what the
settlor assesses is a more serious risk in the particular
case, that they will be harassed by unfounded
accusations from a silly or malicious beneficiary.
(iv) The need for that form of protection against that sort
of risk is a modern phenomenon, arising from the
widening of trustees’ investment and other powers.
That is in general a useful development, but it does
mean that trustees who are asked to invest the fund in
the beneficiary’s husband’s project to extract (and sell)
moonbeams from cucumbers cannot say “Sorry but our
investment clause does not allow it”.
[Note: see for example Birrell, The Duties and Liabilities
of Trustees, 1896, pp 22–24].
(v) Nipping misconceived litigation in the bud is
something the settlor may reasonably consider a
benefit to the beneficiaries (particularly the income
beneficiary’s children if they eventually take capital) as
well as to the trustees. If the trustees are sued for
alleged breach of trust and win, they are entitled to
their costs out of the fund on the indemnity basis so
far as not recovered from the unsuccessful claimant,
and the costs of striking out a silly claim on the basis
that “these allegations do not support a charge of fraud so the
claim will inevitably fail” will be nowhere near the26
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amount the trustees may have to spend to fight on the
facts and then not get back from the claimant or by
impounding his/her interest.
[Note: I think I can properly say, simply on the basis of the
extent of the pleaded factual issues which appear from the
published report of Armitage v Nurse, that if those issues
had been fought and the trustee defendants had won, the
cost to the beneficiaries/fund would have greatly exceeded the
costs of the proceedings which actually took place, even
including the appeal to the Court of Appeal. That will
usually be the case, because a trial which has to go over the
detailed administration of a trust for years or decades will not
be cheap (consider what Nestlé v NatWest may have cost).
Of course this is not a conclusive argument: some viable
breach of trust claims will be barred if “no liability except
for fraud” clauses are used – but that is not a reason to
stop settlors using their judgment to decide that such a risk is
worth taking for the purpose of stifling hopeless or even
blackmailing claims which particular beneficiaries will
otherwise be likely to bring, or for any other purpose which
they think sufficient].
(vi) Of course it is not right for advisers who are going to
be trustees to prepare documents which give them an
advantage (lower insurance premiums) at the possible
expense of the beneficiaries, unless the settlor properly
understands and desires that result. If that is an abuse,
the means to control it are ready to hand in the
probate rules of “want of knowledge and approval” and
the onus placed on someone who is instrumental in
procuring a will in his own favour to establish “the
righteousness of the transaction”. As the law now stands
those principles could be invoked on a trustee
exemption clause in a will in favour of the solicitor
who drew it and is an executor and trustee
(procedurally it would be necessary under the current
law to apply to revoke common-form probate and
obtain a grant in solemn form omitting the
objectionable clause; but reforming legislation could
adopt the substantive principle without carrying over
the procedural complexities). The appropriate way of
reforming the law is to extend those principles to inter
vivos settlements; and perhaps to cast a similar onus not
just on the draftsman but also on other trustees in his
firm or with some other economic connection; or even
to all paid trustees. The onus would be on the trustee:
there would be a strong interest in ensuring, and
preserving evidence, that the settlor’s adoption of such
a clause was understood and intended, and not a charade.
[Note: This is the answer, so far as one is needed, to the
“limitations” mentioned in CP paras 4.44–45; the
requirement being one of substance not of form, with the
onus on the trustee, would ensure that an exemption clause
was not inserted unless the settlor/testator understood it and
wanted it; if that is the position, there is no reason to tell a
donor he cannot give on the terms he wishes, but must give
either something more or nothing at all].
(vii)The objection to the proposal “no reliance on clauses
excluding liability for negligence” is that it unnecessarily
outlaws what may sometimes be the appropriate way
of holding the balance between beneficiaries and
trustees, and deprives the settlor of the power to make
that judgment.
(viii)The proposal also goes further than the control of
approximately similar clauses in contracts, where the
“requirement of reasonableness” or equivalent enables
a judgment to be made on the circumstances of each
case. That is a more appropriate approach for trusts
which are in substance commercial transactions rather
than gifts, eg pension funds.
[Note: Also mortgage securitisations; debenture stock deeds;
any other forms of collective investment? See I(iv) above in
connection with limitation of liability by reference to
availability of insurance].
It is not essential for commercial and family transactions
to be treated the same way. But if “want of knowledge and
approval” principles were applied to pension funds and
other “commercial trusts”, the effect would be in practice
to eliminate exclusions of liability for negligence if the
pensioners/investors were treated as settlors, as they should
be: no professional pensioneer trustee who wanted to stay
in business would be likely to try to persuade each and
every pension fund member that there was a good reason
for agreeing that it should be exempt from that liability.
(ix) Over time, the result of trustees insuring (as
professionals or directly out of trust funds) will be to
throw on trust beneficiaries as a class, through
premiums, the whole amount of negligence claims and
costs, plus a margin for the insurance industry’s profit.
That may be unavoidable; but insurance should not be
regarded as the only way of keeping funds safe.
[Note: if reliance is placed on insurance, the effect will be
that beneficiaries of trusts with competent trustees will fund
the payouts by insurers of incompetent trustees to the
beneficiaries of their trusts. Commercial insurers start by
applying a set premium rate to all business of a particular
class, and any adjustments by means of no-claims bonuses
for good risks, or deductibles and weightings for bad ones,
will not be enough to put the whole burden of payouts on
those who incur them: that is the nature of insurance].
(x) If any change in the law were to be along the lines of
“no exemption from negligence liability”, and were to apply
to future alleged breaches of existing trusts with such
clauses, any trustee of such a trust in office at the
commencement of the legislation should have an
unqualified right to bail out: he/it made the decision to
accept office on that basis, and no-one else should
have the power to make him/it continue in office
exposed to liability on a different basis (particularly if
the size of the fund is such that full insurance cover is
not available or only at exorbitant cost). If all the 27





trustees of a trust resigned, the choice would have to
be between the Public Trust Office taking over, and an
administration action in the Chancery Division.
III CP PART V: CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
Please read these answers in the light of the comments
above.
5.3/4.19: I agree trustee exemption clauses should not
be prohibited outright.
5.4/4.20 Legislative regulation? Family trusts and
similar, yes to the extent of ensuring that
settlors/testators only insert exemption clauses
when they understand and intend their effects
(for consideration whether this should apply
beyond clauses in favour of the settlor’s
draftsman and his firm/associates – on balance
I would support applying such a rule to all paid
trustees); “commercial” trusts, yes to the extent
that such clauses are reasonable having regard
(principally) to the extent to which
beneficiaries have paid for their benefits
(investment pooling or similar) and, following
on from that, ordinary consumer protection
considerations.
5.5/4.32 Pay for indemnity insurance? Insurance is
nothing like the whole answer; but since paid
trustees can insure and set their fees
accordingly, it must be desirable, if possible, to
facilitate insurance by unpaid trustees. Could
the insurance market be persuaded to add
identified lay trustees of specified trusts to the
main professional trustee’s indemnity
insurance at an affordable rate – on the basis
that they will have the advice and assistance of
the main insured and are therefore unlikely to
add greatly to the risk of covering him/her?
5.6/4.39 “Professional” and “lay” trustees? I agree
there should be such a distinction; but I agree
with the criticisms made on 10 April of the
proposal to use Trustee Act 2000 as the means
of drawing it, and I support the simple
distinction between paid and unpaid trustees.
The old-fashioned form of the Armitage v Nurse
clause operates in favour of a trustee “who gives
his services gratuitously”, which strikes the right
balance.
5.7/4.45 Explanations to settlor? This should be the
touchstone of validity of a trustee exemption
clause in a family or similar settlement, i.e. one
made by way of bounty; see above on
adopting/adapting “want of knowledge and
approval” principles.
5.8/4.52 “Requirement of reasonableness”? This is
a possible appropriate alternative to “want of
knowledge and approval” in “commercial”
trusts where the beneficiaries have contributed
to the fund providing their benefits: in that
situation there is a fairly close analogy with
contractual exemption clauses, considered in
Consultation Paper 166, and differences of
treatment between trusts and contracts
performing similar economic functions should
be eliminated as far as possible. “So far as” is
important – it may be more reasonable to
exclude a strict liability than a fault-based one,
and a clause should be capable of being a
curate’s egg.
It would be desirable, if this technique were
adopted, to provide a non-exhaustive list of
relevant matters (but also permitting regard
to be had to anything else which appeared
relevant in the particular case); I suggest they
should include (in no particular order of
importance)
• What insurance against the excluded liability is
available to the trustee, and to the beneficiaries
in respect of loss from the acts for which
liability is excluded;
• Whether and how far the beneficiary has
contributed to the fund or the part of it which
supports his benefits;
• Whether and how far the beneficiary or anyone
else had a choice whether to accept the
exclusion of liability, and took an informed
decision to accept it rather than deal with the
counterparty on other terms or deal with
someone else;
• Whether and how far the excluded liability is
strict or fault-based; and where fault-based,
whether and how far it arises from activities
within any special expertise of the trustee – if
an accountant and a land agent are trustees of
a trust which includes land being farmed in
hand, the accountant may be more deserving of
protection than the land agent if the trustees
take a wrong and arguably silly decision as to
what crops to grow.
5.9/4.66 Prohibition of exemption and judicial
discretion to exonerate? I agree that this
would be unsatisfactory. The main practical use
of Trustee Act 1925 s 61 is to encourage
advisers to advise trustees to act sensibly, even
in the face of residual doubts (but without
actually mentioning the section), where the
cost of a Beddoe application would be
disproportionate. In cases of serious dispute
the existence of s 61 is no real comfort, and
does not enable litigation to be disposed of28
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summarily and costs to be saved; I emphatically
agree with CP paras 4.64-66.
5.10/4.78 “Gross” negligence? I agree that this would
not be a suitable test; the concept is not well-
defined and would simply change and blur the
line which trustees had to be shown to have
crossed; it would increase the complexity of
litigation, widen the range of issues for
investigation, and increase costs. If trustee
exemption clauses are to be permitted at all,
the law should encourage clauses which are
easy to apply without a full and costly trial, eg
preliminary issues (as were used in Armitage v
Nurse) or CPR Part 24.
“Unreasonable etc conduct such that
exemption unfair to beneficiary”? This
would not be satisfactory – it would probably,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, be more
or less a re-enactment of s 61, but (apparently)
with the onus of proof on the beneficiary
rather than the trustee; legislation in these
terms would have all the disadvantages of s 61,
and in the short to medium term the further
disadvantage of creating doubts whether and in
what ways the law had actually been changed.
5.11/4.85 “Professional trustees unable to rely on
clauses exempting from liability for
negligence”? I profoundly disagree, for
reasons developed in more detail above; in brief
• Unjustified interference with settlor autonomy;
• Requiring trustees to accept a long-term
commitment with potential liability which may
be or become uninsurable;
• Ignoring the distinction between “family” and
“commercial” trust relationships, and going far
beyond the consumer protection measures
used and proposed (CP 166) in commercial
relationships constituted by contracts;
• The proposed transitional provisions would
override what will in some cases (where there
is known to be a likelihood of beneficiaries or
their associates trying to put pressure on
trustees) be significant reliance interests.
5.12/4.86 “Unable to rely on exemption clause
where that is unreasonable in all
circumstances including the breach of
trust in question”? In my view this is no
different in substance from the possible
rewriting of s 61 mentioned in the second
branch of question 5.10, and the same
objections apply.
5.13/4.97 Indemnity clauses? I agree that if there is to
be any limit on the right to rely on exemption
clauses, there should be a co-extensive limit on
any right to be indemnified out of the trust
fund – that must follow from the fact that the
obligation of a trustee held liable for breach of
trust is to reconstitute the trust fund as it ought
to be (not to make payments to the
beneficiaries).
Possibility of disapplying duty
exclusion/extended powers clauses? In my
view this would be wrong. I agree with the
reasons given by seminar participants on 10
April why duty definition/duty exclusion (or
limitation)/extended powers clauses are
necessary, particularly where the trust property
includes all or part of an asset such as a farm or
family business which requires specialist
management or the continuing involvement of
the settlor or other family members. Compare
the farming example at the end of 5.8 above, or
trustees who held, say, a 33% shareholding in a
company run by their testator’s younger
brothers who held the rest of the shares: if a
“duty exclusion/extended powers” clause
allowing them to leave the running of the
company to the directors (absent actual
knowledge of mismanagement) were liable to
be disapplied in a breach of trust action, they
could not in reality safely rely on it, and would
have to spend the time and incur the expense
of taking whatever steps were open to them to
monitor and supervise the company – quite
probably, if the brothers were honest and
competent (as at least some businessmen are),
for no actual financial benefit whatsoever.
5.14/4.99 Apply reform to English-law trusts and
also to trustee business “onshore”? In my
view the extension to all onshore trustee
business would be wrong and in private
international law terms excessive/exorbitant,
without any sufficient justification of domestic
public policy. The starting-point is that a
reform of English trusts law should apply to
trusts governed by that law, and comity
requires that there be a strong justification for
going further (and that any extension be no
wider than that justification indicates). So far as
any reform were seen as a “consumer
protection” measure, it would properly be
regarded as for the protection of “onshore”
consumers, and I think the UK legislature
could therefore properly apply the reform to
the administration within the UK (including
Scotland) of trusts satisfying the two criteria
that (a) the governing law would be that of
England and Wales but for any express choice
of another law and (b) a majority of the 29
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beneficiaries by value of their interests are
ordinarily resident in the UK; but there is no
reason to interfere with an express choice of
(say) Jersey or Isle of Man law for what would
otherwise be an English trust, run here wholly
or in part, for beneficiaries in China and Peru
(or places between). A fortiori it would be
wrong to apply any reforms to a settlement
constituted by a Ruritanian settlor under
Ruritanian law in favour of beneficiaries then
all resident in Ruritania, even if one of the
beneficiaries later came to England and the
trustees, operating the Ruritanian equivalent of
the English Trustee Act 1925 s 37(1)(b), (but
not a power to change the proper law if
Ruritanian law allows that,) appointed separate
trustees here to administer a share of the fund
appropriated to that beneficiary.
5.15/4.101Include post-commencement breaches of
existing trusts? In my view this suggestion is
wrong and misconceived, for reasons already
given: it would require trustees to take on
liabilities which the settlor/testator had told
them would not be imposed, and which might
be or become uninsurable. At the very least,
any such reform should be accompanied by an
unqualified right for trustees of existing trusts
to resign, even if all the trustees of a particular
trust wanted to do so; and if the position were
that serious, it would I suggest be impossible to
say confidently that the interests of future
beneficiaries would always be best served by
appointing the existing beneficiaries as trustees
(assuming there would in fact be adult
beneficiaries capable and willing to act).
5.16/4.104Economic and regulatory consequences?
I am not competent to express views on these
issues and do not do so.
Gregory Hill
Barrister, 10 Old Square, Lincoln’s Inn
The supply of a custom-made computer systemwhich satisfies the requirements of the customer isunquestionably dependent upon an accurate
identification of those requirements. Various approaches to
identifying the customer’s requirements may be adopted,
ranging from the completion of a basic questionnaire, to
lengthy and detailed discussions between the parties.
Whichever methods are used to ascertain the customer’s
requirements, it is sound commercial practice to record
them in written form.
The extent of that written information, which may be
both technical and legal in nature, will vary considerably
given the multitude of different transactions which may be
undertaken by different suppliers. Nevertheless, it is to be
hoped that the documentation will represent an accurate
and adequate reflection of the requirements of the
customer, upon which basis the project may proceed. This
may appear to be a relatively straightforward task.
However, the failure to adequately identify the customer’s
requirements and therefore to have produced an accurate
project specification, is a prevalent cause for disputes
arising from the supply of computer systems.
NEED FOR ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION
This article begins from the viewpoint that the task of
identifying the requirements of the customer is a pivotal
stage in the procurement process. Only through an
accurate identification of the customer’s requirements will
the supplier be in a position to provide a system that meets
those requirements. Equally, only through an accurate
identification of the requirements will it be possible for the
Matching expectations
in computer contracts –
what expectations?
by Ruth Atkins
The task of identifying the requirements of the customer is a pivotal stage
in the procurement process.
